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The threat posed by influenza pandemics raises serious ethical 
issues, as well as questions of global health governance. In order to 
create pre-pandemic vaccines, global health authorities need access to 
virus from regional outbreaks. But because the countries where these 
outbreaks occur are unlikely to benefit from the vaccine, they are 
sometimes reluctant to share this seed stock, and may try to make 
proprietary arrangements with pharmaceutical companies, as briefly 
occurred in Indonesia. Although these arrangements may increase 
developing countries' access to vaccine, they hamper the global 
cooperation necessary to prepare for influenza outbreaks. Developing 
countries, in contrast, point to the United States' decision not to use 
adjuvants in influenza vaccines with the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, even 
though this is common in Europe, and it might make tens of millions of 
individual doses available for donation to developing countries. Similar 
issues bedevil preparation efforts, particularly concerning advance 
contracts for vaccines. This paper will examine a number of these 
challenges, and the global health policies needed to address them, 
based on Indonesia’s 2007 decision not to share viral samples with the 
WHO, as well as events during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
Influenza
Developing countries have long pointed to aspects of the World 
Trade Organization (in particular the Trade Related Aspects of 
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Intellectual Property agreement), which they feel unfairly hamper 
efforts to fight major epidemics. During the 1990s these disputes led to 
a major struggle around providing generic drugs to people living with 
HIV. This contest pitted the United States and pharmaceutical 
companies, on the one hand, against developing countries and non-
governmental organizations, on the other. While this contest ended 
with a victory for the Global South, more recently, issues of global 
health equity have focused on influenza.
The influenza virus is a very contagious agent that causes a 
respiratory disease. In the Northern hemisphere the flu season usually 
begins in October and peaks around February. The opposite is true in 
the Southern Hemisphere. For most people flu causes the rapid onset 
of exhaustion, aches, headache, coughing and heaviness in their chest. 
In most cases, with some time in bed and a little care, the flu quickly 
passes. But flu is a highly mutagenic virus, which sometimes 
undergoes major changes, in particular when a form adapted to birds 
enters into humans or other animals. In this case, the world can see a 
devastating pandemic.
The worst pandemic of the twentieth century struck in 1918, 
when an avian form of the flu adapted to humans, and began to spread 
rapidly, perhaps from Haskell County, Kansas. By the time that the 
disease had run its course perhaps 40 million people had died, from 
the hills of Northern India, the country most devastated by the disease, 
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to the trenches of Western Europe during World War One.1 Many 
famous people, such as Woodrow Wilson, may have been infected by 
the disease, which also killed William Osler, the outstanding physician 
of the age.2 As Alfred Crosby and Arno Karlen have argued, one of the 
most unusual aspects of the pandemic is that it has been largely 
forgotten. 3
Significant influenza pandemics also swept the globe in 1957 and 
1968, although neither caused the mortality of the 1918 outbreak. In 
some respects, little has changed in the intervening decades. We do 
have some treatments now for the flu. There are currently four drugs 
used to treat influenza, which can only be obtained in most developing 
countries with a prescription. All must be taken within a short period of 
developing symptoms, and none cures the illness. Instead, they 
shorten the course of the disease and alleviate suffering. Vaccines are 
also available, but they currently represent an imperfect means to 
address this threat. The flu virus mutates rapidly and there are many 
different strains, each characterized by different proteins in their outer 
1  Mike Davis. The monster at our door: The global threat of avian flu. (New 
York: The New Press, 2005), 26, 32.
2  Barry, J.M. The great influenza: The epic story of the deadliest plague in 
history. (New York: Penguin, 2005), 387.
3  Alfred Crosby, America’s forgotten pandemic: The influenza of 1918. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Arno Karlen. Plague’s progress: A 
social history of man and disease. (London: Victor Gollancz. 1995), 145.
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shell. Every year scientists scour the planet looking for different forms 
of the virus. They then have to guess which forms will likely dominate 
epidemics in the coming winter (for each hemisphere). They come to a 
consensus on three different forms. It then takes months to grow the 
virus in chicken eggs. One challenge is that vaccine designers 
sometimes guess incorrectly, and a strain of virus will circulate widely 
which is not covered by that year’s vaccine. Another risk is that a novel 
form will appear for which the vaccine developers are completely 
unprepared.
The current vaccine technology has other limitations, not the 
least of which is that entails the use of millions of chicken eggs, which 
are not only time consuming, but also could be difficult to obtain if a 
bird flu pandemic wiped out chicken farms. Contamination can also be 
a challenge, as proved the case in October 2004, when a plant owned 
by Chiron in the United Kingdom produced a vaccine contaminated by 
a bacteria. This one failure meant that the U.S. health system lost tens 
of millions of expected doses of vaccine.4 The U.S. media asked how 
the country could deal with pandemic flu, if it could not guarantee a 
vaccine supply in a normal year? For this reason, as well as to shorten 
the time entailed for vaccine preparation, there is currently a major 
effort to create new vaccine technologies, which would no longer rely 
on old egg-based approaches to production. Recent events have made 
4 Davis, 140-144.
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this a high priority for the United States government, as well as other 
global health actors.
Initially, global health officials focused on the threat from bird flu. 
In 1997, an outbreak of bird flu in Hong Kong sickened eighteen people 
and killed six. The government killed more than a million chickens in a 
few days, which stamped out the outbreak.5 But this was not the only 
appearance of bird flu. In February 2004, an outbreak of a different 
strain of bird flu in the Fraser Valley of British Columbia caused the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency to order the destruction of nearly 
twenty million chickens. In 2003 and 2004 bird flu again appeared in 
South East Asia, particularly in Vietnam, and it has since spread to 
countries as geographically distant as Turkey and Indonesia. Then in 
2009 a new form of influenza, novel H1N1 (the so-called swine flu) 
emerged in Mexico. In the end, the 2009 pandemic did not resemble 
that of 1918. This was fortunate because in the northern hemisphere 
most people did not have access to the vaccine until after the 
epidemic had peaked.
Even before the 2009 pandemic, efforts to fight the flu raised key 
moral questions. European and North American governments 
collectively spent billions of dollars stockpiling medications, testing 
vaccines, and encouraging basic research on the flu. At the same time, 
developing nations struggling to contain bird flu found comparatively 
5 Davis, 45-54.
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little aid forthcoming for tasks such as culling infected flocks. With the 
emergence of H1N1, developed countries were able to activate pre-
existing contracts with major vaccine manufacturers, which gave their 
countries first access to the vaccines produced. The manufacturers 
would not take orders from poorer but more populous countries, 
because they did not have the capacity. This inequality threatened 
international efforts to contain flu pandemics. 
Indonesia
Even before the emergence of novel H1N1, developing nations 
proved reluctant to collaborate with First World nations to develop 
possible vaccines, because they knew they were unlikely to benefit 
from this research in the event of an outbreak. In some cases, 
developing countries may have sought access to vaccines in the event 
of an outbreak, by making deals with companies that could provide 
vaccine in exchange for access to emerging viral strains. Indonesia, for 
example, did not want to share strains of the bird flu collected from 
fatalities because the country unless it was guaranteed access to any 
vaccine developed from this resource:
In January, frustrated that an Indonesian strain of the virus 
had been used to make a vaccine that most Indonesians 
would not be able to afford, the country stopped 
cooperating with the W.H.O. and made a deal to send 
7
samples to Baxter Healthcare, an American company, in 
return for a low-cost vaccine and help in building vaccine 
factories in Indonesia. Some other poor countries 
applauded the move and debated whether to follow suit, a 
move that could have set back global vaccine research. 
Yesterday, Indonesia’s health minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, 
told reporters in Jakarta that she would resume sending 
samples to the W.H.O. “immediately.”6
In return, the W.H.O. agreed that it would not share its samples with 
vaccine manufacturers. This deal, however, failed to end the conflict.
Supari soon returned to make even more serious accusations 
against the United States, which shocked many observers: “Indonesian 
health minister Siti Fadilah Supari, who is at the center of an 
international controversy over (the) sharing of H5N1 avian influenza 
samples, recently claimed that developed countries are creating new 
viruses as a means of building new markets for vaccines, according to 
an Agence France-Presse (AFP) report. In February, Supari published a 
182 page book titled Time for the World to Change: God is Behind the 
Avian Influenza Virus, which alleges that the United States intended to 
produce a biological weapon with the H5N1 virus and the World Health 
6  McNeil Jr., D.G. (March 28, 2007). “Indonesia to send bird flu samples, with 
restrictions.” New York Times. Accessed online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/28/world/asia/28birdflu.html?
_r1&oref=slogin@page2…; see also Elbe, 481.
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Organization (WHO) was conspiring to profit from H5N1 vaccines.”7 
Supari may have been surprised by the attention the book attracted, 
as “the English translation of the book was officially withdrawn by her 
(due to what she claims were inaccuracies in translation).8 Indonesia 
also threatened to close a key U.S. Navy Medical Research Unit that 
engaged in surveillance of avian influenza, because it feared the 
facility sought to weaponize bird flu.9 Stefan Elbe has suggested, 
however, that her real concern may have been that this facility would 
share viral samples with U.S. government agencies, which would 
undermine Indonesia’s bargaining position both with the WHO and with 
the developed world.10
As part of her argument, Supari had made arguments regarding 
“viral sovereignty.” In this approach, viruses formed part of the 
biological patrimony of the nations in which they were found, which 
held exclusive rights to them. This idea attracted support amongst 
developing countries, such as India, which viewed this approach as a 
means to strengthen their bargaining position with the pharmaceutical 
companies that provided vaccines. The Indonesian government itself 
7  Schnirrer, L. (2008, September 8). Supari accuses rich nations of creating 
viruses for profit. CIDRAP News, search the archive at www.umn.edu. 
8 Elbe, 480.
9  Holbrooke, R. and L. Garrett. (2008), August 10. “`Sovereignty’ that risks 
global health,” Washington Post, accessed online at 
www.cfr.org/publication/16927. She continued to make this argument in 2009. 
See Stefan Elbe, “Haggling over Viruses: the Downside Risks of Securitizing 
Infectious Disease,” Health Policy and Planning, (2010) 25, p. 477.
10 Elbe, 482.
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was divided over this argument, but it attracted a powerful response in 
the West.11 Laurie Garrett and Richard Holbroke published an article in 
the Washington Post, to denounce this concept, which they argued 
would undermine the kind of global cooperation required to face the 
next influenza pandemic. The authors called on China to use its 
influence with Indonesia, and for the United States to exercise 
muscular diplomacy. The issue was particularly important because in 
2007 Indonesia had reported the largest number of H5N1 cases in the 
world, with a case fatality rate of 81%.12 Moreover, in 2007 it appeared 
that the mortality rate from avian flu in influenza in Indonesia was 
steadily increasing “from sixty-three percent in 2005 to eighty percent 
in 2006 and nearly eighty-seen percent in 2007.” These figures, and 
the fear that they created, did much to shape the ensuing debate.13
Supari’s conspiracy theories are nothing new to people who 
study HIV. Similar stories appeared in Haiti in the 1980s, as people 
accused the U.S. government of creating the virus to eliminate the 
islands’ population. But it would be a mistake to associate Indonesia’s 
concerns solely with these statements by the former minister of health. 
Indeed, Indonesia’s President stated that in “Indonesia, we recognize 
that there are issues to be resolved in the world health system, but 
11 Elbe, 477.
12 Endang R. Seyaningsih, Siti Isfandari, Trioni Soendoro and Siti Fadilah Supari, 
“Towards Mutual Trust, Transparency and Equity in Virus Sharing Mechanism: The 
Avian Case of Influenza.” Annals Academy of Medicine Singapore. 2008; 37: 482-8.
13 Kenan Mullis, “Playing Chicken with Bird Flu: `Viral Sovereignty,’ the Right to 
Exploit Natural Genetic Resources, and the Potential Human Rights Ramifications,” 
American University International Law Review, 24:943 (2009), 947-948.
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certainly we don’t believe in conspiracy theories.”14 While Supari’s 
statements were outrageous, a broader set of concerns were neither 
confined to Indonesia, nor mainly based on “conspiracy theories.” 
Instead, they reflected the diverging interests of developed and 
developing countries as they faced a potential pandemic. Indonesian 
authors pointed out that the International Health Regulations, which 
were revised in 2005, did not specifically state that nations had to 
share biological samples.15 They complained that the results of studies 
of these samples were being shared without information first being 
provided to Indonesia. But they were most concerned that 
pharmaceutical companies were developing vaccines using their seed 
stocks without their permission, which finally provoked their decision 
to stop cooperating with the WHO:
Toward the end of 2006, a call by a journalist to the 
Indonesian MOH confirming news that an Australian 
vaccine company’s plan to develop vaccine against H5N1 
virus strain that Indonesia had provided to the WHO 
system triggered Indonesia’s drastic action. The fact that 
pharmaceutical companies had access to Indonesian 
(vaccine seed) viruses that were shared with the WHO 
affiliated laboratories was not only in violation (again) of 
14  Lisa Schnirring, “Supari accuses rich nations of creating viruses for profit,” 
CIDRAP, September 8, 2008, accessed on-line at 
www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/ 
influenza/avianflu/news/sep0808indonisa.ia-br.htm.
15 Seyaningsih, et al., 484.
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the WHO guidance for virus sharing (March 2005), but also 
–as strongly argued by Indonesia- revealed the unfairness 
and inequities of the global system.16
The WHO recognized that this was a major issue, which extended 
beyond the perceptions of one government official. The WHO sent 
representatives to Indonesia in February, which had agreed in March to 
resume sharing samples on a provisional basis, and by May of 2007 a 
working group was formed to begin studying this problem.17 But these 
steps failed to resolve the dispute. 
Despite the anger that Indonesia’s position created in developed 
countries, the country could continue to count on international support. 
In February 2007 the medical journal the Lancet published an editorial 
in response to Indonesia’s declaration, which said that the WHO 
needed to achieve an agreement that would demonstrate solidarity in 
preparing for the next pandemic.18 Non-aligned nations also found 
Indonesia’s argument to be attractive. In May of 2007 Indonesia raised 
these questions at a meeting of the World Health Assembly. During 
this meeting, developing countries launched a critique of how the 
World Health Organization had shared viral seed stock samples:
In the course of these deliberations, it emerged that WHO 
16 Sedyaningsih, et al., 486.
17 Seyaningsih, et al. 487.
18 For discussion of this issue see Chan Chee Khoon, “Equitable Access to Pandemic 
Flu Vaccines,” a paper presented at the Conference on Strengthening Health and 
Non-health Response Systems in Asia, March 18-19, 2010, Singapore. Accessed on-
line from Third World Network” on January 28, 2011 at 
www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/2010.health20100303htm.
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had not abided by the terms of the 2005 WHO guidelines 
on sharing of viruses which required the consent of donor 
countries before WHO’s collaborating centers could pass 
on the viruses (other than the vaccine strains) to third 
parties such as vaccine manufacturers. While discouraging 
the use of material transfer agreements (MTAs) at the 
point when donor countries transferred their virus samples 
to the WHO, WHO’s collaborating centers nonetheless 
resorted to MTAs when they transferred to third parties 
vaccine strains containing parts of the viruses supplied by 
developing countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam and 
China.  Indeed WHO’s collaborating centers themselves, as 
well as third parties, had sought patents covering parts of 
the source viruses used in developing vaccines and 
diagnostics.19
Perhaps because of these revelations, twenty developing countries 
entered a resolution to the World Health Assembly “calling for a new 
international framework to be set up for the sharing of avian influenza 
viruses, to review the existing WHO research system and to prioritize 
the manufacture and availability of vaccines in developing countries.”20 
The goal of this resolution was to provide rights to those 
19 Chan Chee Khoon, p.2.
20 Martin Khor, “Developing Countries Call for New Flu Virus Sharing System,” South-
North Development Monitor (SUNS) #6253, May 15, 2007. Accessed on February 2, 
2011 at www.twnside.org.sg/title2/avianflu/news.stories/afns.006.htm
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countries that shared viral seed stock samples. From the perspective 
of developing countries, they saw little benefit from sharing viral 
samples with the World Health Organization. They perceived that these 
samples were being shared improperly with companies that used them 
to create vaccines for profit, which were then sold at prices far too high 
for the developing world to purchase. For this reason, the resolution 
stated that any “vaccines, diagnostics, anti-virals and other medical 
supplies arising from the use of the virus and parts thereof must be 
made available at an affordable price and in a timely manner to the 
developing countries, particularly to those under the most serious 
threat or already experiencing the pandemic threat.”21 This resolution 
was opposed by the United States, which was particularly concerned 
that changes to the “Material Transfer Agreements” (which governed 
viral seed stock sharing) might undermine global collaboration to 
produce vaccines against pandemic strains of the vaccine. In the end, 
the World Health Assembly passed a resolution calling on the WHO to 
create a vaccine stockpile, as well as “new terms of reference for the 
sharing of influenza viruses.”22 Nonetheless, the WHA resolutions failed 
to create a comprehensive framework to address these issues. Even 
so, Indonesia has returned to sharing viral samples with the WHO, as 
part of the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN).23
21 Khor, p.3.
22 Chan Che Khoon.
23 For an excellent overview of this history see Rachel Irwin, “Indonesia, H5N1, and 
Global Health Diplomacy,” Global Health Governance, 3:2, Spring 2010, accessed on-
line on January 2, 2011 at www.ghgj.org.
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While developing nations –such as India, Thailand and Brazil- 
sympathized with this position, there have been substantial critiques of 
Indonesia’s position, both by developed states and international law 
experts.24 One challenge for Indonesia is that viruses do not respect 
borders. Because of this reality, how can they be considered an aspect 
of biodiversity under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)?25 
The Indonesian precedent also seemed to threaten health in other 
nations, which was prohibited by article three of the CBD.26 In other 
words, the very convention that Indonesia was invoking to uphold its 
position, appeared to prohibit Indonesia’s decision to withhold viral 
seed stocks. Similarly, Kenan Mullis has argued not only that 
Indonesia’s position likely violated article twelve of the International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but also that the 
means for its protest are too severe to be justified given the end that it 
seeks to achieve.27 In sum, although Indonesia’s position attracted 
much sympathy because it evoked the frustrations of many developing 
countries, it stood on shaky legal ground.
As more information became available, it also became clear that 
Indonesia’s position, at least initially, may have been focused on more 
than bird flu alone. Indeed, it seemed that the WHO had managed to 
address many of Supari’s immediate concerns in 2007:
24 For the nations supporting Indonesia’s position, see Elbe, 479.
25 Mullis, 955.
26 Mullis, 957.
27 Mullis, 958, 967
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. . .Supari also felt sufficiently emboldened to hold out for 
more than just a few concessions made by the West, and 
to push for a fundamental transformation of the virus-
sharing mechanism. When, for example, she was 
approached by the WHO with offers of a laboratory 
upgrade and as much vaccine as they needed in February 
2007, she turned these offers down. . . Rather than simply 
accepting these offers of material support, and resolving 
the dispute there and then, the Indonesian health minister 
instead formulated a much stronger demand that made 
Indonesia’s resumption of virus sharing conditional upon a 
more fundamental reformation of the whole-virus-sharing 
mechanism.28
From this perspective, the WHO appears to have made reasonable 
accommodations to the concerns of Indonesia, but was rebuffed.
The 2009 Novel H1N1 Pandemic.
Despite numerous discussions in various forums, the global 
health community had made little progress on this issue by the time of 
the 2009 pandemic. During the crisis, poor nations could not access 
vaccines: “Despite appeals to humanitarian solidarity and to 
enlightened self-interest, almost all of the first billion doses of H1N1 
vaccine produced in 2009 were allotted to 12 wealthy nations which 
28 Elbe, 482.
16
had made advance orders. Sanofi Pasteur and GlaxoSmithKline 
pledged 120 million doses to the WHO for distribution to poor 
countries, but even those pledges could be fulfilled only months after 
the pandemic had waned.”29 In response, Laurie Garrett warned that 
events seemed to be proving Supari’s fears.30 Other scholars have 
wrestled with the ethical problems that this experience raised. Even 
while the epidemic waned, developing countries remained uncertain if 
they might receive unused vaccine from wealthy countries.31
It is true that the World Health Organization made a substantial 
effort to push manufacturers and the developed world to make vaccine 
available for developing nations. But it was clear that this could not be 
the main tool to fight the epidemic, as Dr. Marie-Paule Kieny, the 
director of the Initiative for Vaccine Research at the World Health 
Organization stated in a 2009 interview:
Q: What happens if developing countries have only partial  
coverage?
A: Coverage will be partial and not only in developed 
countries. But we should not be “hypnotized” by vaccines. 
There are other measures, such as social distancing, school 
closure, avoidance of large gatherings, antibiotics and 
personal hygiene. This is not a disease like rabies, which is 
29 Khoon, p. 3.
30 Khoon, p.3.
31 Marcel Verweij, “Health Inequities in Times of a Pandemic,” Public Health Ethics, 
2:3 (2009): 207-209.
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100% fatal: we are talking about a disease from which 
most people recover very well.32 
Dr. Marie-Paule Kieny also pointed out that the WHO had obtained 
commitments for 150 million doses of vaccine for developing countries 
from manufacturers, which was a major achievement. For developing 
countries, nonetheless, the 2009 pandemic served to accentuate their 
concerns that in the case of a truly lethal pandemic, they would be 
largely relying on the same public health measures that had been used 
during the 1918 pandemic. Of course, it was also true that this would 
be the case for citizens in developed countries. But concerns about 
global health equity remained, particularly in South-East Asia, which 
was the front-line of the global effort to contain avian influenza.
The main reason that developing countries could not obtain 
vaccine was the lack of production capacity and the existence of 
advance contracts. But another challenge was that in 2009 the United 
States government made the decision not to use adjuvants to stretch 
the supply of vaccine. By using adjuvants, which are chemicals that 
stimulate the immune systems’ response to an antigen, vaccine 
manufacturers could make more vaccine available from existing 
production facilities. But policy makers in the United States worried 
that the public would not accept their use, despite the fact that Europe 
has a long history of employing them. 
32 Anonymous, “WHO Supports fair access to influenza A (H1N1) vaccine,” Bulletin of 
the World Health Organization, 2009, 87: 654.
18
In part, the U.S. decision may have reflected the political realities 
after a now-discredited study by British physician Andrew Wakefield, 
which suggested that there was a link between childhood vaccinations 
and autism. Many years and millions of dollars were spent discrediting 
this study, which was based on a small number (twelve) children, and 
which also seems to have been based on fraudulent data, according to 
an article in the British Medical Journal in 2011. Even though Wakefield 
was discredited, however, popular fears about vaccines remained. This 
likely shaped the U.S. government’s decision not to use adjuvants in 
the novel H1N1 vaccine formulation. But this also meant that far more 
vaccine stock would be needed, which decreased the amount of 
vaccine that could be shared with developing countries. These nations 
found themselves to be in the position of depending upon decisions in 
the wealthy countries to receive vaccine. Fortunately, the pandemic 
had a relatively low level of lethality.
The Current Standoff
While Indonesia’s position has moderated slightly since the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic, the issue remains unresolved. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for Indonesia, Marty Natalegawa, expressed the position of 
developing countries during an interview on September 20, 2010, 
during which Laurie Garrett called in to ask him about the concept of 
viral sovereignty. He argued that work and resources from Indonesia 
contributed greatly to the development of vaccines, but Indonesia and 
19
other poor countries had little chance of being able to benefit from 
them: “And I think what our present administration is doing is precisely 
striking a balance; how to ensure, on the one hand, we live up to our 
international obligations; but, on the other hand, . . . how we must 
make the issue of access to vaccines by developing countries a bit 
more prominent in international discourse, in terms of making sure 
that countries like Indonesia have –as a population within it, have 
access to vaccines.”33
While Indonesia has continued to hold to its position, the position 
of developed nations has also remained the same: 
Western countries, on the other hand, feared the 
human and economic impact of delayed detection of an 
emerging influenza pandemic and wish to avoid the 
precedent of acquiescing to `viral blackmail.’ The global 
health community’s reaction to these events has been 
split, because Indonesia’s actions are seen as undermining 
global influenza surveillance, but also as a clarion call to 
overturn long-standing inequities in the global 
pharmaceutical market. Both Indonesia’s actions and the 
various global actors’ responses have complex roots in 
self-interest, and domestic and international politics.34
33 Transcript, “A Conversation with Marty Natalegwa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic of Indonesia,” Council of Foreign Relations, September 20, 2010.  Accessed 
on January 31, 2011 from www.cfr.org/publication/22984/conversation_with _marty
34 Harley Feldbaum, Joshua Michaud, “Health Diplomacy and the Enduring Relevance 
of Foreign Policy Interests,” PLoS Medicine, 7:4: 
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Harley Feldbaum and Joshua Michaud have argued that developing 
countries believe that the 2005 revisions of the International Health 
Regulations were undertaken so as to reflect the interests of the most 
powerful countries: “. . .the IHR were adopted because they served 
powerful state interests, and accordingly some developing countries 
view the IHR as an instrument of the foreign policy and national 
security interests of developed countries seeking protection from 
epidemics emanating abroad, and therefore as only an extension of 
age-old power politics.”35 In short, there remain substantial concerns 
within the developing world, both regarding the overall structure of 
global health governance, as well as the independence of the World 
Health Organization.
Confidence regarding the integrity of the World Health 
Organization was further undermined in 2010, when Deborah Cohen 
and Philip Carter published an article in the British Medical Journal, 
which revealed that there serious conflicts of interest within the WHO. 
Some committee members who recommended stockpiling medications 
(Tamiflu and Relenza) and other measures to prepare for a pandemic 
were revealed to have financial ties to the pharmaceutical companies 
most likely to benefit from these measures. For the WHO’s critics, this 
revelation created issues of transparency in the WHO’s policymaking 
e1000226.doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000226, 7.
35 Feldbaum and Michaud, 7. For more information on IHRs see Lawrence O. Gostin, 
“International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the World Health Organization’s 
International Health Regulations.” Journal of the American Medical Association, June 
2, 2004, 291:21, 2626 (double check page number). 
21
process.36 In particular, they questioned the WHO’s decision to declare 
the 2009 HIN1 outbreak a “pandemic” despite the relatively low 
mortality rates. They also pointed to concerns about the political 
influence held by industry-funded groups such as the European 
Scientific Working Group on Influenza. Was the WHO too tightly 
connected to major pharmaceutical corporations to create 
disinterested health policy? 
In a larger sense, most observers have agreed that the reason 
that global health governance has not changed because the status quo 
favors the interests of the most powerful nation-states. David Fidler 
argued that a new framework for global health governance appeared 
unlikely in 2010: “The prospects for such a framework are not, 
however, promising, because the national interests of most developed 
states vis-á-vis dangerous influenza strains favor retaining the existing 
imbalanced, reactive, and ad-hoc approach to vaccine access.”37 
Indonesian authors have made the same point: “Poor countries have 
no bargaining position, because their participation in the production of 
these products are not valued as they are `just’ natural resources 
(clinical specimens, viruses, and other microbes); on the other hand 
the industrialized countries’ contributions are highly valued because 
36 Deborah Cohen, Philip Carter, “WHO and the Pandemic Flu `Conspiracies.’” British 
Medical Journal, June 2010, 340: 2912.
37 David P. Fidler, “Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: Global Health 
Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5N1 and Pandemic 
Influenza, H1N1.” PLoS Medicine. 7(5): e1000247. 
Doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000247.
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they are human invented technology.”38 
This perception might change rapidly in an avian flu pandemic 
with greater lethality than its 1918 forerunner. In that case, would 
countries Egypt or Indonesia share viral seed stocks in time to create 
vaccines in the developed world? Or might they be tempted to 
withhold stocks as a bargaining tool to obtain more vaccine? What 
would be the international political costs if the U.S. did not choose to 
use an adjuvant, which reduced vaccine supplies for other nations, 
during a severe pandemic? The existing order seems tolerable only 
because the international community has not faced a truly severe 
public health crisis. 
In the 1990s, HIV/AIDS came to be seen as a security issue, 
because of the instability that the disease might foster in developing 
countries.39 This argument was made from within a traditional, realist 
security perspective. Within in the framework of human security, which 
focuses primarily on threats to the individual rather than to the state, 
influenza is clearly a preeminent security challenge, because few 
dangers could cause such major casualties, short of nuclear warfare or 
bioterrorism. From this viewpoint, influenza preparation is more than a 
solely health concern, and merits substantial resources and attention 
to address. In 2005 then Senator Barack Obama argued in the New 
York Times that avian influenza posed a security threat to the United 
38 Sedyaningsih et al, 487.
39 Harley Feldbaum, Kelly Lee, Preeti Patel, “The National Security Implications of 
HIV/AIDS,” PLoS Medicine, 2006, 3(6): e171. Doi:10:1371/journal.pmed.0030171.
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States.40 But there are dangers to securitizing health issues, as the 
drug wars in Mexico and Colombia illustrate. If they defied the WHO, 
would nations such as Indonesia be defined as rogue states in a new 
international health order? Currently, the WHO has no enforcement 
ability regarding International Health Regulations, which makes such 
concerns appear unrealistic. But Stefan Elbe has made the argument 
that it was precisely because avian flu was increasingly viewed in 
terms of security that the standoff between the West and Indonesia 
became so severe.41 This approach may seem attractive because of 
both the resources and governmental attention that it can help to 
bring to a problem.42 But if Elbe’s argument is correct, then the issue is 
best dealt with as an issue of global health governance. 
The Rise of Transnational Alliances
At the same time, global health raises larger issues that lead to 
questions about the nation-state as the main actor in international 
politics. Is the nation-state the best level of analysis for global health 
problems? Niam Stephenson has argued that people no longer look 
solely to the nation state for “rights and representation” but rather to 
an array of other transnational actors. In the era of globalization, 
questions of sovereignty and health create new perspectives on the 
international order. Stephenson suggests that the WHO has been a 
40 Elbe, 478.
41 Elbe, 476-485.
42 Elbe, 479, 482.
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weakening political actor because of decades-long trend in which it is 
underfunded. As the WHO has worked to securitize health in order to 
respond to international health challenges, new political actors are 
becoming involved in these affairs, which he called “aggregates.” 
These aggregates are alliances between varying actors –developing 
countries and NGOs, the World Health Organization and 
pharmaceutical companies- that mobilize around an ideology to 
achieve their health objectives. Stephenson suggests that this 
international order is shaped by neoliberal objectives, in particular the 
need to ensure the unimpeded flow of trade goods, in a manner that 
can conflict with health goals, such as the need for quarantine. In this 
context, Stephenson suggests that nationalist rhetoric, such as that of 
Supari, is employed to challenge transnational powers and the 
neoliberal agenda. As such, Indonesia’s position represented more 
than a challenge to influenza preparation. Developing countries fear 
that pharmaceutical companies are driving global health policy, as a 
new market for growth. But current influenza preparations often 
exclude developing countries, by such means as advance contracts, as 
the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 suggested. From this perspective, 
Indonesia’s effort represented an alternative alliance for global health 
policy –one between a developing country and a vaccine maker, 
Baxter- rather than the existing “aggregate” between the WHO and 
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global pharmaceutical corporations.43
Stephenson’s argument raises key questions. In what way does 
the securitization of health discourse challenge existing ideas about 
the nation-state, and what groups does it empower? When we discuss 
health security, do we mean security for the individual or the state? 
Why has sovereignty been at the core of these discussions, and which 
entity has the right to assert authority over biological samples? Is the 
concept of “aggregates” a useful one to understand the emerging 
players in global health? To what extent do neoliberal economic ideals 
shape current policy-making by health actors such as the WHO? And 
perhaps most of all, who should people look to, in order to make 
decisions for global health? In the long term, policy-making as part of 
pandemic preparations will have to address these questions. At the 
same time, in the short term there are also some practical, hard 
questions to answer. What then, should global health actors, such as 
the World Health Organization, do in the face of a pandemic?
Public Health Policy
Practical issues bedevil preparation efforts, particularly 
concerning advance contracts for vaccines. Given current structures, if 
all organizations and states act in a rational fashion, they may make 
choices that could keep tens of millions of vaccine doses from use in a 
43 This paragraph is based on Niam Stephenson, “Emerging Infectious 
Disease/Emerging Forms of Biological Sovereignty,” Science, Technology and Human 
Values, 2010, 1-22.
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pandemic. A series of public health steps are needed to increase 
confidence in the WHO, to respond to the demands of developing 
countries for greater access to vaccines, and to ensure the continued 
access of the WHO to viral seed stocks. Many authors have made 
recommendations for improving the current situation, which the 
following list builds upon:44
1. The Material Transfer Agreements used by the World Health 
Organization should specify that if viral seed stocks are used by 
a corporation to produce vaccines, then a portion of those 
vaccines must supplied to the country of origin at a reasonable 
price during a pandemic.
2. The World Health Organization should ensure that all people 
involved in the formulation of health policy related to influenza 
are not retained or employed by vaccine manufacturers or 
pharmaceutical corporations that produce medications to treat 
influenza.
3. The WHO should request that advance contracts for influenza 
vaccine only be adopted only if the contract states share a 
fraction of the vaccine produced with developing countries.
4. The WHO should request that developed countries should 
dedicate a portion of foreign aid to supporting the stockpiling of 
44 See Mullis, 964-967.
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medications and vaccines for influenza in the developing world. 
In addition, the World Bank should prioritize loans to increase not 
only vaccine production capability in developing countries, but 
also their surveillance and reporting infrastructure. In some 
countries, such as Brazil, the World Bank’s support created 
dramatic changes in the efforts to fight HIV/AIDS. A targeted 
effort could achieve the same with preparations for influenza.
5. Developed countries –in particular the United States- should 
conduct research on adjuvants, to identify those that could be 
used with confidence in a pandemic. These nations should 
commit the use of adjuvants in a pandemic, in order to ensure 
that vaccine supplies are stretched to the maximum extent 
possible.
6. Developing nations should commit to sharing viral seed stocks 
with the World Health Organization in as rapid a manner as 
realistically possible, and to support the World Health 
Organization’s International Health Regulations.
Conclusion
The global community has recently evaded a number of 
disasters, such as the 2003 SARS pandemic, which was ultimately 
contained, and the 2009 influenza pandemic, which proved to have a 
relatively low mortality rate. Still, we cannot expect that we will 
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continue to enjoy such good fortune. While issues of global health 
equity may appear to be abstract questions, in a health crisis they 
would rapidly escalate into diplomatic crises. For this reason, there is a 
pressing need to resolve these questions before a crisis strikes. As 
Stefan Elbe has argued, Indonesia’s protest has led to some changes: 
“Already, the WHO has taken some steps to accommodate the 
demands of Indonesia and other developing countries, including the 
development of a system for tracking the movement of shared H5N1 
virus samples, and exploring the feasibility of creating a stockpile of 
vaccines that developing countries could draw on.”45 While these 
technical steps are helpful, they do not address the larger questions 
that influenza pandemics entail.
Part of the reason that this political dispute has been so difficult 
is that it has challenged our existing assumptions about the global 
order, which is predicated on the notion that nation-states are the key 
political actors, which should act on a rational basis to defend their 
national interests. The trouble with this assumption is two-fold. Global 
health problems can only be addressed through collaboration, which is 
unlikely to be achieved if the key actors are the nation-states alone. 
Second, there are key transnational actors, in particular big 
pharmaceutical companies and vaccine manufacturers, which are 
global actors in their own right. These actors are capable of entering 
45 Elbe, 483.
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into commercial and research partnerships with both nation-states and 
international organizations in a manner that can profoundly impact 
individuals’ ability to access both vaccines and medicines. Stephenson 
points also what has taken place with HIV/AIDS over the last decade, 
during which huge amounts of money have been funneled by what he 
calls “vertical actors,” such as the World Bank and non-governmental 
organizations.46 In this context, health cannot be considered outside 
the context of larger global political questions. Before the next crisis 
comes, as it will, the global community needs to address not only the 
technical questions that are entailed, but also the broader 
philosophical issues, in order to create a new framework for pandemic 
preparedness. 
46 Stephenson, 13.
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